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1. Introduction  
Findings of biases in official economic projections have been a feature of studies of EU 
member states’ forecasting behaviour.   Such biases not only give the public a distorted view 
of the economic outlook but also impinge on the budgetary process and can lead to fiscal policy 
failing to meet budgetary targets.   This is of particular concern in the euro area where a single 
currency, embracing a common monetary policy among those member states adopting the euro, 
places an onus on governments to exercise effective budgetary policy at the national level and 
to abide by cross-EU fiscal rules.    
Concerns that biases arise in member states’ output forecasts and in official projections in the 
EU more generally have been raised with some time.   Strauch et al. (2004) found budgetary 
projections to be sensitive to where economies were in the output cycle and member states not 
using the information available to them efficiently.   Jonung and Larch (2006) identified an 
"optimism bias" among the four largest EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, and the 
UK), where official output growth forecasts, on average, over-estimated the underlying speed 
of growth of the economy.   When realised output growth proves less than expected, as an 
optimism bias implies, then budgetary outcomes can prove to be poorer than initially projected.   
This increases the risk of EU deficit and debt thresholds being violated and may even call into 
question the overall fiscal and economic direction that a member state is taking.   Gilbert and 
de Jong (2017) show a bias in the European Commission’s forecasts which they attribute to the 
EU fiscal rules, in particular the 3 per cent threshold on member states’ deficit ratios.      
Major EU fiscal rules reforms in the early 2010s were adopted, in part, to improve the 
forecasting performance of member states.   The European Semester, in effect since 2011, 
allows for a more intrusive examination of member states’ budgetary plans over the medium-




oversight of member states’ forecasting at the national level.   This includes a role for 
independent forecasting authorities.   Jonung and Larch (2006, p. 529) advocate for the use of 
such institutions to "foster the production of unbiased forecasts".   The European Commission 
(2014) sees independent forecasting bodies as being able to improve tasks such as 
macroeconomic forecasting at the national level, by providing their own forecasts or endorsing 
the forecasts of the national finance ministry.   Reviewing the preparation of the 2015 draft 
budgetary plans for the euro area member states (excluding Cyprus and Greece), the European 
Commission (2014, pp.62-63) finds that all bar three member states had either separate 
macroeconomic forecasts produced by independent fiscal authorities or those bodies endorsing 
official forecasts.1        
With these fiscal rules reforms in place and member states formulating budgetary policy with 
the input of independent forecasting oversight bodies, an improvement in official forecasting 
in the EU might be expected.   Against that, the literature suggests that fiscal rules, such as 
arise in the EU, may cause bias and related difficulties.   An optimism bias may reflect 
governments meeting their budgetary forecasts ex-ante by adjusting their output growth 
forecasts rather than altering fiscal policy (Frankel, 2011).   Member states may come under 
pressure to set economic and fiscal programmes that are overly ambitious in the first instance.   
Their failure to be implemented in practice may, however, call into question the credibility of 
budgetary planning (Beetsma et al., 2009).   Similarly, as Jonung and Larch (2006) point out, 
if biases in forecasting economic activity are the cause of governments missing deficit targets 
 
1 Among the three member states that are the exceptions, the economics department and budgetary departments 
within Finland’s finance ministry are separated from one another, while in Germany the ministry’s 
macroeconomic forecasts involve independent research institutes.   At the time the article was published, the 
macroeconomic forecast of the finance ministry in Latvia had not yet been endorsed by that country’s fiscal 




then changing deficit rules may not have the desired effect if such biases persist regardless of 
the rule changes.    
Against this background, this paper examines whether biases are present, or absent, in official 
output growth forecasts since 2013 when the Fiscal Compact, the last substantial reform of the 
EU rules, took effect.   It does so using current year and one-year-ahead projections from both 
member states’ Stability and Convergence Programmes and the European Commission’s 
Spring Forecasts, along with outturn data from the EU AMECO database.   An econometric 
investigation of the data indicate that deficiencies remain evident in official forecasts in the EU 
despite the reforms put in place in the early 2010s.   The empirical analysis shows that output 
growth forecasts are unduly pessimistic, are irrational, and are influenced by recent economic 
activity.   This holds for both the member states’ and Commission’s forecasts.   Output gap 
forecasts also have an influence on output growth projections.   The implications of these 
findings, which indicate that the historical deficiencies of official forecasts in the EU remain 
in place, are considered in the final section of the paper. 
2. Background and Literature Review 
Prior to the euro area sovereign bond market crisis that took hold in late 2009, fiscal policy in 
EU member states was not conducted in a satisfactory manner.   The European Commission 
(2011, p. 70) notes “persistently lax fiscal policy” prevailing during that period, while Beetsma 
et al. (2009) find fiscal adjustment regularly falling short of what was planned in annual 
budgets.   Such behaviour may, or may not, have been unexpected given the fiscal rules 
framework put in place in the EU prior to the introduction of the euro. 
Recognising that member states might not behave prudently in monetary union, the Stability 
and Growth Pact was adopted in 1997 to monitor and enforce compliance with the fiscal 




member states (both those in the euro area and outside it) avoid excessive deficit positions, 
those being where General Government deficit ratios exceed 3 per cent of GDP and/or General 
Government debt ratios above 60 per cent of GDP.   It does so through the operation of both a 
preventive arm (involving surveillance of national public finances) and a corrective arm 
(requiring member states to adopt policies that correct excessive deficit and/or debt positions).   
Central to the preventive arm is the submission of Stability and Convergence Programmes 
(henceforth, SCPs) by member states.2   SCPs set out member states’ budgetary and economic 
forecasts over a medium-term horizon (including the current year).   Reforms of the Pact have 
occurred over the years and have focussed on improving both the preventive and corrective 
arms.   The first substantial changes to the Pact occurred in 2005.   Those placed a greater 
emphasis on consideration of national economic circumstances and sharpened the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.    
The financial crisis and, in particular, the turmoil in euro area sovereign bond markets between 
2009 and 2012 called into question the efficacy of the EU fiscal rules and their implementation.  
Financial markets grew concerned at the fiscal position of some of the area’s member states 
(Caceres et al., 2010), with a rapid deterioration occurring in national public finances.   These 
developments undermined confidence in the efficacy of budgetary surveillance and practice at 
country and EU levels and led to a series of initiatives at the EU level.   The European Semester 
was enacted in 2010 and took effect in 2011.   It was initiated to improve ex-ante economic 
and budgetary policies among member states.   The Semester refers to the first half of each 
calendar year at the centre of which is the submission of SCPs by member states in April.   
 
2 Stability Programmes are submitted by euro area member states while Convergence Programmes are submitted 




Those programmes are subject to peer review by the European Commission and other member 
states by end-June.    
The other substantial Pact-related development in the 2010s has been the adoption of the Fiscal 
Compact (more formally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) in 2012, 
effective from the start of 2013.   Its intention was to strengthen the Pact by requiring member 
states to improve their economic and budgetary projections by making the best use of available 
data and by making budget rules more binding by their adoption into domestic law.   Both the 
Council Directive 2011/85 on national budgetary frameworks and the 2013 regulations 
introduced a role for national independent fiscal institutions in domestic budgetary practice 
with a view to tackling forecasting issues.    
Against this background of how the EU fiscal rules have developed over time, findings of 
biases, and in particular an optimism bias, in official government forecasts, including in the 
EU, is commonplace in the literature.   In a study of 33 countries, Frankel (2011) finds official 
government forecasts having a positive average bias and a larger bias at longer time horizons.   
He finds that among those countries, euro area member states have a particularly large bias, 
which may explain frequent violations of the excessive deficit threshold occurring ex-post.   
Over-optimism also arises on both the upside and downside of the economic cycle but is less 
obvious when GDP is close to its trend value.   Forni and Momigliano (2004) detect an 
optimism bias among OECD countries, while Frankel and Schreger (2013) find an optimistic 
forecasting bias on the part of euro area member states that is particularly pronounced during 
booms.   They also find bias to be at its lowest at the shortest forecasting horizon when 
independent fiscal authorities are in place.    
Several studies have also considered whether the imposition of fiscal rules in itself creates 




the budgetary behaviour of member states bound by the EU fiscal rules.   This includes 
governments failing to implement planned budgetary adjustments in full and the greater use of 
stock-flow adjustments when budgetary plans are more ambitious.   Jonung and Larch (2006) 
observe EU governments overestimating output growth in their forecasts.   Similarly, Strauch 
et al (2004) find an optimism bias arising in SCPs, which a later study by Marinheiro (2011) 
backs up.   In relation to the European Commission, Gilbert and de Jong (2017) hypothesise 
and illustrate that its forecasts are biased upwards when member states expect EU fiscal rules 
to hold.  
One mechanism for curbing biases and political sway in the budgetary process is the putting in 
place of institutions that remove such influences (Fabrizio and Mody, 2006).   Independent 
fiscal councils at the national level are one such institution.   As well as playing an important 
role in strengthening transparency and accountability in fiscal policymaking and 
notwithstanding that such councils are designed differently between EU member states, one 
specific task they can address, as advocated by the post-crisis EU fiscal rule initiatives, is to 
improve economic forecasting, including tackling forecasting bias.    
Jonung and Larch (2006) sum up the basis for independent input into official forecasts by 
noting that economic forecasting is not something governments are particularly well-equipped 
to do and that it should be left to non-political experts with the necessary technical expertise to 
provide the short-to-medium term projections required.   They find independent fiscal 
institutions not having a statistically significant bias in their forecasting, while Debrun and 
Kinda (2017) observe fiscal councils being associated with better macroeconomic and 
budgetary projections through lower forecasting bias.   Reuter (2019) finds independent 
monitoring and enforcement bodies improving compliance with numerical fiscal rules in EU 
member states between 1995 and 2015.   Against these favourable assessments, Beetsma et al. 




database and find fiscal councils not having any meaningful effect on the forecast errors of the 
real GDP growth rate.   A cyclical bias in growth forecasts remains with undue optimism 
occurring in good times and pessimism arising in bad times.    
While Jonung and Larch (2006) and others argue for delegating macroeconomic forecasting at 
the national level to independent agencies, Marinheiro (2011) asks whether the delegation 
should be conferred on supra-national bodies.   He finds the European Commission’s 
forecasting record to be good in the short term while there is considerable variation in the 
accuracy of member states’ forecasts.   He concludes that the Commission’s projections 
provide a good benchmark for assessing those of the member states and that national 
governments should be asked to explain large deviations in their forecasts from those of the 
Commission.   An earlier study by Leal et al. (2008) advocates for the role of supra-national 
bodies’ oversight of national forecasting processes as a basis for reducing forecasting 
deficiencies, including political biases.   In contrast, Merola and Perez (2013) find the same 
shortcomings that arise in member states’ projections also occurring for the European 
Commission. 
The view of the European Commission (2014) itself on this issue is that independent 
forecasting authorities (which it terms “fiscal watchdogs”) can, inter alia, “produce or endorse 
macroeconomic forecasts for the budget preparation that do not suffer from the optimistic 
biases often found in official government forecasts”.    They can also “impartially monitor the 
implementation of budget plans and the respect of fiscal rules and budgetary objectives”.3   A 
study by Commission staff (Jankovics and Sherwood, 2017) notes that among the 19 euro area 
member states, independent forecasting bodies directly provide macroeconomic forecasts in 







of finance produce the macroeconomic forecasts with the national fiscal councils then assessing 
and endorsing those projections.   The authors focus on comparing the forecasts of real GDP 
growth to the outturns for that variable and find that independent fiscal councils have reduced 
optimism bias but not forecasting accuracy.   They argue that the economic recovery after the 
financial crisis earlier in this decade could have rectified the optimism bias that was present 
before it (between 2000 and 2007).       
In the following sections of this paper, the macroeconomic forecasting performance 
(specifically in relation to real GDP growth rates) of both the member states and the European 
Commission since 2013 are assessed against this background of fiscal reforms aimed at 
improving such performance.   Output growth rate forecasts are central both to agents’ overall 
perception of how the economy is expected to perform and to government deficit and debt 
projections which are dependent on cyclical conditions in the economy.4   Including the 
Commission’s projections alongside those of the member states in the empirical analysis will 
shed light on whether any shortcomings in forecasting are shared between both entities.  
3. Data and methodological approach 
3.1 Data 
To assess member states’ output growth forecasts, annual projections and outturns from 2013 
to 2018 for both real GDP growth rates and output gaps are used.   The forecasts are taken from 
the European Commission’s annual overview of SCPs submitted in the current year (published 
 
4 Any bias or inefficiency in output growth rate forecasts will distort the projections for the government deficit 
and debt ratios.   The efficiency of forecasts of these key fiscal variables are not considered in this study as the 
bias and irrationality of the output growth rate forecasts illustrated below is sufficient to make the case that official 
forecasts in the EU remain imperfect.    Moreover, the interpretation of government deficit and other fiscal data 
can be compromised by policy changes and the influence of one-off effects, including the ‘creative accounting’ 
of stock-flow adjustments that have been used to improve budget balances and meet EU deficit criteria (Von 




in its Institutional Papers series each autumn).5   As well as containing the real GDP growth 
rate forecasts, which are the main focus of attention here, provided in the SCPs in April, the 
overviews published since 2013 also contain tables of its recalculation of member states’ SCP 
output gap estimated outturns and forecasts according to a commonly-agreed methodology.   
Those harmonised series render consistent the data provided by member states for that variable, 
which benefits the econometric analysis undertaken here.   A starting date of 2013 is 
appropriate not only for the benefit of this harmonisation of data but, more importantly, because 
the post-crisis enhancement of the EU fiscal rules had been largely completed by then, with the 
European Semester in operation and the Fiscal Compact having taken effect.   The analysis 
thus examines a period when the enhanced fiscal rules and policy-monitoring framework would 
have been expected to benefit member states’ forecasting.6    
Projections for both real GDP growth and output gaps from the European Commission’s Spring 
Forecast are also included in each of its annual reviews of the SCPs.   Both the Commission’s 
and the member states’ estimated outturns for the previous year (𝑡 − 1) and projections for the 
current year (𝑡) and the following year (𝑡 + 1) are included in its overview publication.7   The 
Commission’s projections are used here as a comparator for assessing member states’ 
forecasting prowess and to see whether a supra-national body (the European Commission), 
detached from the member states, might prove to have better forecasting power.   Outturn, or 
 
5 For example, the 2018 overview can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-
finance/ip088_en.pdf.   The data used here are taken from the statistical annexes to these publications.  
6 The period 2013 to 2018 was one when the EU economy moved from underperformance (with an output gap 
reported by the AMECO database at -2.9 per cent in the EU in 2013) to seeing output exceed capacity in 2017 
and 2018 (with an EU output gap of 0.8 per cent in the later year).  Among the 138 observations used in this study, 
56 are for countries-years when a positive output gap arose.    
7 Noting that SCPs are submitted in April each year, the current year forecast in the 2017 SCPs, for example, 




ex-post, real GDP growth rate data necessary to the tests employed below are taken from the 
EU AMECO database.      
By way of representation, the real GDP growth rate (𝑔) forecasts for the current year (𝑡) and 
the following year (𝑡 + 1) are the principal variables under consideration here.   These period 
signatures are added as subscripts to the variables, as appropriate, and the superscripts 𝑆𝐶𝑃 and 
𝐸𝐶 indicate whether the forecasts being referred to are from member states’ SCPs or the 
European Commission’s Spring Forecasts, respectively.   The real GDP growth rates that are 
observed as the ex-post outturns, and are calculated from the real GDP outturns reported in the 
AMECO database, have the superscript ‘𝐴𝑀𝐶’.   The output gap, forecasts of which are used 
as an explanatory variable in some of the later regressions, is denoted as 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝.    
There are gaps in the data for specific member states within the Commission’s annual 
overviews.   These principally relate to SCPs not being submitted by them for some or all years 
between 2013 and 2018, whether due to their being in an official rescue programme (Greece 
and Cyprus) or their membership of the EU (Croatia).  To work with a balanced panel of data, 
those member states are then excluded.   There are also large outliers among the outturn (i.e. 
AMECO) GDP growth rate data relating to observations for Ireland and Malta, where very 
high growth rates were reported in some years.   Given that such outliers could affect the bias 
tests reported upon below, those two member states were excluded from the panel as well.   
Consequently, the panel comprises data for 23 EU member states over the years 2013 to 2018.    
In each year, the member states and the Commission each forecast for the current year (𝑡) and 
the following year (𝑡 + 1).   Consequently, there are current year forecasts for the years 2013 
to 2018 and one-year-ahead forecasts for 2014 to 2019 in the SCPs submitted between 2013 
and 2018 (and, likewise, in the Commission’s Spring Forecasts).   The 𝑡 + 1 dataset comprises 




at that horizon.   The current year panel comprises 138 observations.   The AMECO outturns 
for the current year are denoted 𝑔 , while those in the one-year-ahead dataset are specified 
as 𝑔 . 
Figure 1 plots the current year and one-year-ahead real GDP growth rate forecasts of both the 
member states and the European Commission in histogram form, with the matching AMECO 
outturns in the bottom two panels.   Table 1 provides the basic descriptive statistics of the data 
in those charts.   It is evident that both the mean and medians of the outturn real GDP growth 
rates are higher than the forecasts of both the member states and the Commission, i.e. negative 
forecasting errors are in evidence - that is the outturn growth rates are greater, on average, than 
the forecasts.   There is no more than a 0.11 per cent mean difference in the forecasts contained 
in the SCPs and in the Spring Forecasts, while the median values are identical at both horizons.   
The range of forecasts (as measured by the difference between maximum and minimum values 
in the table columns) is larger for the member states than the Commission.    
3.2 Methodological approach 
The approach taken here to the data is to inspect the output growth rate forecasts of the 
individual member states (treated as one group) and of the European Commission from a 
number of perspectives.   Initially, whether the forecasts for years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 are biased is 
assessed by examining whether GDP growth rate forecast errors (the differences between the 
forecasts and their respective observed outturns, as taken from the AMECO database) are, on 
average, equal to zero or not.   The relative performance of the forecasts in terms of accuracy 
of the Commission with those of the member states is also considered using a standard two-
tailed t-test.    
These tests are added to by panel regression estimations, with a fixed effects model being 




address endogeneity issues between the left- and right-hand side variables of the regression 
equations that a standard OLS estimation would not achieve.  The rationality of the member 
states’ and Commission’s forecasts are evaluated by whether their respective GDP growth rate 
forecasts accurately predict the actual, or observed, GDP growth rates (provided by the 
AMECO database).   These estimations use, in turn, the current year (𝑡) and next year (𝑡 + 1) 
forecasts as right-hand-side variables.   The determinants of the GDP growth forecasts are 
considered by examining the extent to which they are influenced by the estimated outturn of 
output growth by the member states/Commission for the previous year (𝑡 − 1) and the relevant 
output gap projections.   The latter are used here to examine whether forecasters’ own 
assessments of where the economy will be in the economic cycle have implications for their 
real GDP growth rate forecasts.  
4. Econometric Results 
4.1  Properties of forecast errors 
To assess forecasting performance, the properties of the errors that the member states and the 
European Commission make in forecasting real GDP growth (i.e. the difference between the 
output growth rate forecasts for years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 and what the observed ex-post outturns for 
those years are in the AMECO database) is critical.   The initial test employed here then is a 
two-sample t-test, which examines whether the means of the forecast errors of both the member 
states and the European Commission are statistically different from one another.   The test is 
conducted for individual years and for the sample as a whole (2013–2018 for the current year 
forecasts and 2014–2018 for the one-year-ahead forecasts).   For both the individual years and 
the sample as a whole, the null hypothesis of no difference between the forecast errors cannot 




Table 3 provides further statistics on the forecast errors.   In examining forecast errors as to 
whether they are rational and/or unbiased, the approach of Croushore and Van Norden (2018), 
who build on earlier work by Campbell and Dufour (1991) and Campbell and Ghysels (1995), 
is followed.   The median error is examined alongside the mean error as the latter can be 
sensitive to large outliers and a lack of power in certain circumstances.   Statistical tests in 
Table 3 indicate both mean and median errors to be significantly different from zero.8   In all 
cases then the null hypothesis that either the mean or the median error is equal to zero is 
rejected.   Both mean and median forecast error are larger at the one-year-ahead forecast 
horizon than in the current year.   This table then confirms what Table 1 suggested: that both 
the member states and the Commission were pessimistic in their output growth forecasts during 
the 2013-2018 period.    After the event, this was a period when the euro area was emerging 
from a period of recession in the early 2010s.   AMECO data indicate that for the years 2013 
to 2016 the gap between actual and potential GDP was negative, if diminishing, for the EU as 
a whole (from -2.9 per cent of potential GDP in 2013 to -0.6 per cent in 2016).   Only in the 
final two years of the sample used here were positive, if small, output gaps reported (of 0.4 per 
cent in 2017 and 0.8 per cent in 2018).       
4.2  Regression results 
In Tables 4a and 4b, the results of regressions of the actual outturns for the real GDP growth 
rate on the contemporaneous forecasts in the SCPs, or the Spring Forecast, and fixed effects 
pertaining to the individual member states are reported.    As noted in Döpke et al. (2018) and 
Audretsch and Stadtmann (2005), the null hypothesis of a rational forecast can be rejected in a 
 
8 The first test, using a t-statistic, is of the null hypothesis that the sample mean value is equal to zero.   In all four 
cases, the null hypothesis is rejected.   The null hypothesis that the sample median equals zero is tested using a 
series of tests (the binomial distribution sign test, the normal distribution sign tests, the Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test, and the Van der Waerden (normal scores) test).   Again, for all four cases considered in Table 2, the 




panel regression if the coefficient on the contemporaneous/one-year-ahead forecast is not equal 
to one and/or the individual country dummies are not jointly equal to zero.   In Tables 4a and 
4b, which show the results for year 𝑡, the coefficient on the forecast variable is statistically 
different from one and the F-tests on the inclusion of the fixed effects (as reported at the bottom 
of each table) reject the null hypothesis that the country dummies are not different from zero.9 
10   These results, taken with the results in Table 3, indicate that the null hypothesis of rational 
expectations in the forecasting processes of the member states and the European Commission 
is rejected in both cases.      
Having examined the rationality and bias, or otherwise, of forecasts, what affects or determines 
the current year and one-year ahead growth expectations of the member states and the European 
Commission is considered next and, in particular, whether the issues raised in the previous 
tables also influence those expectations.   For example, if future GDP growth expectations are 
motivated by past growth performance then this would point to the presence of bias in the 
forecasting generating processes of member states and the Commission.   A significant 
coefficient on the estimated output growth rate variable would indicate that forecasters exhibit 
a form of extrapolative expectations with past GDP growth rate developments having an impact 
on future growth rate expectations.  Consequently, the estimated GDP growth outturns for the 
past year in the SCPs and the Spring Forecast are included in the regression specifications. 
As part of the forecasting process, both member states and the Commission also publish 
forecasts of the output gaps for the current year and one year ahead.   Given that the output gap 
 
9 In the case of Table 4a, the null hypothesis for the country dummies is only rejected at the 6 per cent level.       
10 To save space, the results where the observed growth rates for 𝑡 + 1 are regressed on the member states’ or 
European Commission’s forecasts for 𝑡 + 1 and fixed effects are not shown in tabular form (but are available 
from the authors on request).   For the regression where the member states’ forecasts for 𝑡 + 1 are the explanatory 
variable, a coefficient value of 0.31 (with standard error of 0.15) is reported.   That coefficient is statistically 
different from one.   The test on the inclusion of the fixed effects also reject the null hypothesis that the country 
dummies are not different from zero (with a F-statistic of 3.57).   Similar qualitative and quantitative results arise 




provides their assessment as to where an economy’s aggregate output is in relation to its 
potential, it is informative to see whether that variable also has explanatory power on GDP 
growth projections.   The motivation for including the output gap variable in the regression 
specification comes from Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Marcelino and Musso (2011) and 
González-Astudillo (2018) who argue that the usefulness of estimates of the output gap can be 
assessed by their ability to predict future output growth.   Marcelino and Musso (2011), in 
particular, examine the predictive content of alternative measures of the euro area output gap 
in out-of-sample forecasts of output and find significant forecast gains from including the 
output gap.   The current year and one-year-ahead output gap forecasts in both the SCPs and 
the Spring Forecasts are plotted in histogram form in Figure 2, while their descriptive statistics 
(in Table 5) indicate their mean and median values to be negative in value.     
Consequently, the final set of regressions involves regressing the forecast GDP growth rate (in 
𝑡 or 𝑡 + 1, respectively) on the estimated GDP growth rate outturn for 𝑡 − 1 at the time the 
forecasts are made, the output gap projection (for 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, respectively), and country fixed 
effects.   The results in Tables 6a and 6b indicate that output growth forecasts are indeed 
influenced by the estimated growth rate for the past year and by the position of the aggregate 
output in the economic cycle.11   The significance of the previous period’s outturn on the 
forecast confirms that both sets of forecasters’ future expectations are not in line with the 
rational expectations hypothesis.   There is a degree of inertia amongst both member state and 
Commission forecasters in that their estimated output growth rate outturn for the previous year 
has a positive and significant impact on the output growth rate forecast for the current year.   In 
both cases, the degree of inertia is of a similar magnitude (0.49 for the member states and 0.44 
 
11 For the 𝑡 + 1 real GDP growth rate forecasts, the coefficients on the right-hand-side variables have the same 
sign as those reported in Tables 6a and 6b and are statistically significant.   For the SCP regression, the coefficient 
on 𝑔  is 0.16 with a t-statistic of 2.52 and the coefficient on 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝  is 0.20 with a t-statistic of 2.54.  For the 
Commission forecasts, the coefficient on 𝑔   is 0.18 with a t-statistic of 3.96 and the coefficient on 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑝  is 




for the Commission).   These coefficient values imply that if GDP growth is estimated to have 
grown by 1 per cent in year 𝑡 − 1 then this causes the forecast growth rate in year 𝑡 to increase 
by almost 0.5 per cent.   This result suggests that neither member state nor Commission 
forecasters exhibit mean reversion in their growth expectations.   
The coefficients on the output gap variable in Tables 6a and 6b are positive and statistically 
significant.   This coefficient sign provides backing to the views of Giannone and Reichlin 
(2006) and Marcelino and Musso (2011) that the output growth rate forecast may be a function 
of where in the cycle forecasters expect the economy to be.   Strauch et al. (2004) observed 
that budgetary projections in the early years of monetary union were sensitive to where 
countries were in the output cycle with member states not using information available to them 
efficiently.   A positive coefficient on the output gap projection for the current year, such as 
arises in Tables 6a and 6b, means that a negative output gap projection, as was the norm in the 
2013 to 2018 period, significantly reduced the output growth rate projection in the same year.    
5. Conclusion 
The empirical results in this paper indicate that the deficiencies reported in previous studies of 
biases and inefficiencies in official forecasts in the EU remain in the post-financial crisis era.   
This occurs against the background of the significant reforms of the EU fiscal rules and 
procedures that took place in the early 2010s.   The results do not lend support to the view of 
Jonung and Larch (2006) and others that independent forecasting bodies, which have become 
commonplace in member states in recent years, help foster the provision of unbiased forecasts 
in the EU.   The results for the European Commission’s projections are broadly similar to those 
for the member states indicating that that supra-national body, which, unlike individual 
countries, has no incentive to deceive or be inaccurate in its predictions, does not have a better 




A central finding of other studies in this area (Jonung and Larch (2006), Beetsma et al. (2019)) 
is that recent growth performance affects official output growth forecasts in the EU.   
Examining the period between 1999 to 2006, Marinheiro (2008) notes that European 
policymakers have a propensity to underestimate output growth after the trough of the business 
cycle.   These cyclical effects hold here as well, with pessimism observed in the forecasts 
occurring during a period when EU member states were operating mostly on the downside of 
the economic cycle.   This suggests that the lessons from earlier studies have not been absorbed 
into forecasting processes, although it is also possible that the additional checks and 
intrusiveness into member states’ forecasts in recent years may not only have quelled any 
optimism bias on their part but caused their forecasts to move in the opposite direction.   
Furthermore, the similarity of the results between the Commission and the member states 
reported here suggests that the findings of Von Hagen (2010) and Merola and Perez (2013) - 
that the reliance of supra-national organisations on national governments for country 
information may cause these organisations to absorb the biases of the member states - still hold.   
The vouched improvements in surveillance and enforcement that the new EU fiscal framework 
would deliver in the aftermath of the financial crisis have not removed biases and other 
inefficiencies in official forecasting processes in the EU. 
To conclude, this paper finds that many of the forecasting mistakes of the past persist under 
the new enhanced EU fiscal rules framework.   This may arise because of longstanding factors, 
such as the relatively strong emphasis on ex ante, as opposed to ex post, compliance with the 
fiscal rules in the EU (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010).   Another explanation is that the 
independent fiscal institutions model has not yet been fully developed or implemented in the 
EU.   While acknowledging that independent fiscal bodies have become an integral part of EU 
policymaking in recent years, the European Fiscal Board (2019) points out that such bodies 




constraints, and that these affect their ability to review and endorse forecasts.   Likewise, 
Jankovics and Sherwood (2017) find that while the early years of independent fiscal institutions 
in the EU have seen these bodies provide a useful role in national fiscal policymaking, there is 
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Mean (%) 2.12 2.02 2.38 
Median (%) 2.00 2.00 2.34 
Maximum (%) 6.10 4.70 6.99 
Minimum (%) -2.30 -2.30 -1.73 
Standard deviation 1.36 1.29 1.50 
Skewness -0.20 -0.57 -0.17 
Kurtosis 3.84 3.76 3.44 
Jacque-Bera 4.98 10.74 1.77 
Number of observations 138 138 138 
    
 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
 𝑺𝑪𝑷 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
 𝑬𝑪  𝒈𝒕 𝟏
𝑨𝑴𝑪 
Mean (%) 2.36 2.25 2.69 
Median (%) 2.10 2.10 2.58 
Maximum (%) 5.50 4.40 6.99 
Minimum (%) 0.20 -0.10 -0.63 
Standard deviation 1.03 0.90 1.26 
Skewness 0.66 0.22 0.39 
Kurtosis 3.04 2.44 3.29 
Jacque-Bera 8.34 2.44 3.31 





Table 2: Comparison of GDP growth rate forecast errors (Two-sample t-test) between SCPs 
and European Commission Spring Forecast 
Period 𝒕 𝒕 + 𝟏 
2013 0.42 0.14 
2014 0.19 0.27 
2015 0.15 0.20 
2016 0.28 0.41 
2017 0.30 0.86 
2018 1.11  
2014-2018  0.77 
2013-2018 0.88  
Note: date in first year column refers to year in which forecasts for 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 were made. 
 
Table 3: Statistics of GDP growth rate forecast errors 
 𝒈𝒕
 𝑺𝑪𝑷 − 𝒈𝒕
𝑨𝑴𝑪 𝒈𝒕
 𝑬𝑪 − 𝒈𝒕
𝑨𝑴𝑪 
Mean (%) -0.26 -0.36 
Significance (Mean = 0) 0.00 0.00 
Median (%) -0.22 -0.26 
Sign (exact binomial) 0.03 0.00 
Sign (normal approximation) 0.03 0.00 
Wilcoxon signed rank 0.00 0.00 
Van de Waerden test 0.00 0.00 
Number of observations 138 138 
   
 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
 𝑺𝑪𝑷 − 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
𝑨𝑴𝑪 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
 𝑬𝑪 − 𝒈𝒕 𝟏
𝑨𝑴𝑪 
Mean (%) -0.34 -0.44 
Significance (Mean = 0) 0.00 0.00 
Median (%) -0.32 -0.37 
Sign (exact binomial) 0.00 0.00 
Sign (normal approximation) 0.01 0.00 
Wilcoxon signed rank 0.00 0.00 
Van de Waerden test 0.00 0.00 
Number of observations 115 115 




Table 4a: Regression of observed GDP growth rates (𝐠𝐭
𝐀𝐌𝐂) on member states’ 
contemporaneous GDP growth rate forecasts and country fixed effects  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
𝐠𝐭
 𝐒𝐂𝐏 0.73 0.08 9.60 
Belgium 0.42 0.39 1.07 
Germany 0.62 0.40 1.56 
Estonia 1.28 0.43 2.99 
Spain 0.68 0.41 1.68 
France 0.40 0.39 1.01 
Italy 0.01 0.39 0.02 
Latvia 0.65 0.46 1.41 
Lithuania 1.06 0.44 2.41 
Luxembourg 0.65 0.46 1.42 
The Netherlands 0.72 0.40 1.80 
Austria 0.31 0.40 0.76 
Portugal 0.63 0.39 1.61 
Slovenia 1.37 0.41 3.36 
Slovakia 1.06 0.44 2.41 
Finland 0.40 0.39 1.03 
Bulgaria 1.13 0.42 2.70 
Czech Republic 1.29 0.42 3.10 
Denmark 0.81 0.40 2.03 
Hungary 1.47 0.44 3.34 
Romania 1.67 0.48 3.49 
Poland 1.23 0.45 2.72 
Sweden 0.66 0.43 1.53 
United Kingdom 0.68 0.41 1.67 
 
𝑅  0.61 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.71 
F-test (Country Dummies) 1.58 with significance level 0.062 
Note: Panel of annual data from 2013 to 2018 (138 observations).   Country entries are fixed effect 






Table 4b: Regression of observed GDP growth rates (𝐠𝐭
𝐀𝐌𝐂) on European Commission’s 
contemporaneous GDP growth rate and country fixed effects 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
𝐠𝐭
 𝑬𝑪 0.78 0.08 10.16 
Belgium 0.38 0.38 1.00 
Germany 0.45 0.39 1.15 
Estonia 1.19 0.42 2.83 
Spain 0.61 0.40 1.54 
France 0.39 0.38 1.01 
Italy 0.05 0.37 0.14 
Latvia 0.62 0.45 1.38 
Lithuania 0.82 0.44 1.87 
Luxembourg 0.71 0.44 1.62 
The Netherlands 0.68 0.39 1.76 
Austria 0.35 0.39 0.90 
Portugal 0.61 0.38 1.61 
Slovenia 1.35 0.40 3.40 
Slovakia 1.00 0.43 2.34 
Finland 0.45 0.38 1.20 
Bulgaria 1.17 0.40 2.89 
Czech Republic 1.28 0.40 3.17 
Denmark 0.69 0.39 1.79 
Hungary 1.53 0.42 3.62 
Romania 1.85 0.45 4.10 
Poland 1.10 0.45 2.48 
Sweden 0.56 0.42 1.33 
United Kingdom 0.58 0.40 1.46 
 
𝑅  0.63 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.69 
F-test (Country Dummies) 1.73 with significance level 0.032 
Note: Panel of annual data from 2013 to 2018 (138 observations).   Country entries are fixed effect 









Mean (%) -0.95 -0.85 
Median (%) -0.8 -0.7 
Maximum (%) 3.2 3.4 
Minimum (%) -6.6 -6.7 
Standard deviation 1.67 1.76 
Skewness -0.33 -0.39 
Kurtosis 3.32 3.14 
Jacque-Bera 3.16 3.53 
Number of observations 138 138 
   
 𝒚𝒈𝒂𝒑𝒕 𝟏
 𝑺𝑪𝑷 𝒚𝒈𝒂𝒑𝒕 𝟏
 𝑬𝑪  
Mean (%) -0.81 -0.63 
Median (%) -0.7 -0.4 
Maximum (%) 2.7 2.6 
Minimum (%) -4.8 -4.7 
Standard deviation 1.25 1.5 
Skewness -0.21 -0.26 
Kurtosis 3.42 2.76 
Jacque-Bera 1.73 1.56 





Table 6a: Regression of forecast GDP growth rates (𝐠𝐭
𝑺𝑪𝑷) on estimated GDP growth rates, 
contemporaneous output gap projections, and country fixed effects 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
𝐠𝐭 𝟏
𝑺𝑪𝑷 0.49 0.06 7.70 
𝒚𝒈𝒂𝒑𝐭
𝑺𝑪𝑷 0.16 0.07 2.37 
Belgium 0.91 0.28 3.26 
Germany 0.87 0.28 3.11 
Estonia 1.35 0.28 4.81 
Spain 1.57 0.36 4.32 
France 1.07 0.31 3.51 
Italy 1.17 0.29 3.96 
Latvia 1.37 0.30 4.63 
Lithuania 1.37 0.30 4.56 
Luxembourg 2.14 0.36 5.97 
The Netherlands 1.21 0.30 4.06 
Austria 1.21 0.28 4.36 
Portugal 1.27 0.31 4.15 
Slovenia 1.19 0.29 4.15 
Slovakia 1.84 0.37 5.01 
Finland 1.07 0.29 3.65 
Bulgaria 1.29 0.32 4.04 
Czech Republic 1.41 0.30 4.67 
Denmark 1.35 0.34 3.98 
Hungary 2.01 0.31 6.41 
Romania 2.07 0.38 5.48 
Poland 1.88 0.34 5.52 
Sweden 1.55 0.31 4.92 
United Kingdom 1.11 0.29 3.85 
 
𝑅  0.79 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.35 
F-test (Country Dummies) 3.52 with significance level 0.000 
Note: Panel of annual data from 2013 to 2018 (138 observations).   Country entries are fixed effect 




Table 6b: Regression of forecast GDP growth rates (𝐠𝐭
𝑬𝑪) on estimated GDP growth rates in 
𝑡 − 1, contemporaneous GDP projections, and country fixed effects 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Stat 
𝐠𝐭 𝟏
𝑬𝑪  0.44 0.06 6.92 
𝒚𝒈𝒂𝒑𝐭
𝑬𝑪 0.18 0.06 2.77 
Belgium 0.93 0.27 3.44 
Germany 1.06 0.27 3.87 
Estonia 1.35 0.27 5.02 
Spain 1.62 0.34 4.71 
France 1.09 0.30 3.68 
Italy 1.08 0.28 3.83 
Latvia 1.37 0.29 4.68 
Lithuania 1.58 0.29 5.48 
Luxembourg 1.96 0.34 5.77 
The Netherlands 1.21 0.29 4.24 
Austria 1.11 0.27 4.10 
Portugal 1.21 0.28 4.26 
Slovenia 1.15 0.28 4.19 
Slovakia 1.85 0.35 5.28 
Finland 0.98 0.28 3.47 
Bulgaria 1.19 0.31 3.89 
Czech Republic 1.38 0.29 4.69 
Denmark 1.51 0.34 4.51 
Hungary 1.81 0.30 6.11 
Romania 1.75 0.36 4.85 
Poland 1.95 0.32 6.01 
Sweden 1.63 0.31 5.30 
United Kingdom 1.18 0.28 4.20 
 
𝑅  0.78 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 
F-test (Country Dummies) 3.84 with significance level 0.000 
Note: Panel of annual data from 2013 to 2018 (138 observations).   Country entries are fixed effect 




Figure 1:  Histogram plots of real GDP growth rate forecasts and outturns   
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Figure 2:  Histogram plots of output gap forecasts   
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